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A scene in the film Napps – Memoire of an Invisible Man (2014) portrays a sunny
day in lively Görlitzer Park in Berlin. I walk across the fresh grassy terrain of
the western part of the park, examining from afar Africans standing beside
the gravelly path in groups of 3 or 4, who are themselves examining their
surroundings  as  they  converse.  Not  far  from  the  tens  of  visitors  sitting,
talking, laughing outside the park's café, I notice a dark-skinned man in a
light jacket standing alone in the shade of a tree. I approach him, smile and
say that I am working on a film and looking for someone who would agree to
tell me about himself. The man smiles back, but his smile is never seen in the
scene, nor is he seen himself. This scene is in fact a recreation of my first real
meeting  with  Mr.  X.  When  this  meeting  actually  occurred,  it  was  still
January. Mr. X was standing on the other side of the park under the branches
of naked trees, covered in a heavy dark winter coat, vividly contrasting the
white surface of the empty and silent snowy park. "You know, I am a journalist,
and I studied photography" he said to me when I told him about the film that I
wanted to make. We both smiled at the potential of a joint project. He gave
me his phone number. 
1 In the past  decade,  the interest  in collaborative ethnography has been on the rise.
Collaboration  with  members  of  a  researched  community  was  the  center  of  many
discussions  in  the  2008  American  Association's  annual  meetings  (Haley  2009:  577).
Moreover, due to its ability to create a rich polyphonic ethnographic text and maintain
a  research  ethically  conscious  to  the  subjective  experience  of  the  so-called  Other,
collaboration  has  been  endorsed as  a  potential  "twenty-first-century  standard  of
research  practice"  (Fluehr-Lobban  2008:  181).  Yet,  the  collaborative  practice  was
examined in the field of cinema already in the 1950s, specifically in filmic experiments
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of the ethnographic filmmaker Jean Rouch (Henley 2009: 309). Films such as Moi, Un Noir
and (1958),  Petit  à Petit  (1971)  display an improvisational  role-play of  Rouch's  West
African protagonists, which according to him determined the film's narrative, and thus
challenge  the  conventional  hierarchy  between  socio-cultural  researchers  and
researched Others (Rouch 1978: 8). The choice to replace the researcher's control over
the ethnographic text and over the knowledge that it provides about the Other with an
improvised dialogue parallels in a way the ethical approach developed in the 1960s,
specifically by Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas criticizes the emphasis of Western thought
on knowledge, and calls to abandon ontology in favor of ethics as "first philosophy"
(1979: 46-47). His view challenges the raison d'être of ethnographic knowledge, just as
the  use  of  visual  media  challenges  conventional  written  ethnography.  This  ethical
stance played a central role in the filmic experiment on which I embarked in 2014 with
a West-African refugee, to whom I shall refer as Mr. X.
2 In the filmic collaboration Napps – Memoire of an Invisible Man, Mr. X performed as the
main protagonist, yet could not appear on camera. Due to his political status, Mr. X was
banned  from  working  legally  in  Berlin.  Hence,  he  was  forced,  out  of  cautionary
measures, to conceal his identity and share the story of his exile while remaining off-
screen.  Instead,  Mr.  X,  then  an  amateur  photographer,  took  the  role  of
cinematographer and thus became a collaborator in a film about his own invisibility.
Through the  portrayal  of  his  forced  invisibility,  Mr.  X  embodies  the  experience  of
instability of many migrants living in nation-states in which they do not enjoy citizen
rights (Beneduce 2008: 506). Furthermore, the migrants lose the possibility to publicize
their story in mass media, out of the need to stay invisible. As they lose control over
their own story, it remains in the hands of videographers and storytellers mostly in
service of mainstream media. In my collaborative project, I aimed at both confronting
and bypassing the lack of control of my protagonist and collaborator over his own story
and image.  In  the  following text  I  shall  revisit  Napps and examine  the  ethical  and
epistemological effect of Mr. X's position behind the camera through Levinas's ethical
approach towards what he calls the “irreducible Other”, as will be detailed further. I
shall  expand  on  the  influence  of  this  approach  on  critical  theories  in  the  field  of
documentary and ethnographic film, and apply it in the analysis of Mr. X’s and my film,
while  exploring  the  following  question:  How  can  a  collaboration  with  an  African
migrant in the making of a film about his/her experience in diaspora serve the purpose
of constituting a new kind of subjectivity, an irreducible Otherness? Can this form of
collaboration truly stand up to its ethical aspirations?
3 
This media file cannot be displayed. Please refer to the online document http://
journals.openedition.org/anthrovision/5547
Video link: https://vimeo.com/96679622 
 
Collaboration out of Constraint
4 My  choice  to  make  a  collaborative  film  with  a  man  unable  to  show  his  face  was
organically born out of the understanding of the representational constraint he faced.
When I first met Mr. X in the park in Berlin, I knew nothing about his legal status in
Germany, and so never thought to suggest that he join me behind the camera. In our
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first  scheduled meeting,  my initial  questions to him were general  and vague.  I  was
interested in various themes for my film, none of which referred to the experience of
"illegality". Over a cup of cappuccino, Mr. X, began sharing his story: after escaping
from West  Africa  (for  reasons  that  cannot  be  revealed),  he  sought  asylum in  Italy.
Following a 6-month wait in a refugee camp in Foggia, he was granted his residence
permit as a refugee. He learned Italian in 6 months, studied photography and worked
on a project with an online newspaper. Having completed the project, Mr. X was faced
with financial duress directly triggered by the economic crisis, which led to difficulty in
absorbing refugees and foreign job seekers.1 Finding it practically impossible to reach
financial  independence and being forced to  join the black labour market  where he
competed for jobs against large crowds of undocumented migrants, Mr. X decided to
move to Berlin using the travel documents he received from the Italian authorities.
Though excited to move "because it was an adventure" as he said, Mr. X knew he would
have to reside in Berlin without work permit due to the Dublin I and II regulations.2 
Upon hearing about his legal status, I asked Mr. X: "Can you in fact appear in front of the
camera?" "No," he said shyly. I pondered for a moment. "So, what if instead, you shoot the
film?" Mr. X said he was interested. 
5 This idea to place Mr. X behind the camera rather than in front of it led to the forming
of a kind of representation of "illegality" in which Mr. X's face remains invisible while
his  audible  narration  expresses  his  subjective  voice.  Before  I  move  on  to
contextualizing this choice politically and epistemologically, I should mention that this
choice emerged much more from the dynamic and the chemistry with Mr. X than from
rational thought or critical aspiration. While telling me his story, Mr. X's warm voice
resonated with what felt like the weight of a whole personal history. Yet at the same
time, there was something light, humorous and poignant about his delivery. It implied
that  his  speech,  words,  tone,  could  construct  a  strong  cinematic  presence  without
having to rely on visual representation; that, despite his absent figure, his voice could
embody his  subjective Self.  As David MacDougall  says,  "voices are more completely
embodied in a film than faces, for the voice belongs to the body. Visual images of people,
by contrast, result only from a reflection of light from their bodies… whereas a voice
emanates actively from within the body itself: it is a product of the body" (1998: 263).
This ability to portray the body is, to MacDougall, a major potential of filmmaking as an
ethnographic  tool.  If  a  written  text  succeeds  much  more  than  film  in  expressing
analytical generalities about unique cultural habits and patterns, then, conversely, film
can  depict  the  human  body  in  a  manner  that  allows  the  ethnographic  portrait  to
include concrete physical, psychological, emotional attributes – elements shared by all
human beings. This inclusion of human similarities that transcend cultural varieties
suggests  a  broad  perception  of  the  field  of  ethnography  and  its  anthropological
purpose: ethnographic research as Karen O'Reilly argues, is capable of producing a rich
account of daily lives of human subjects in a manner that respects the irreducibility of
human experience and agency (2005: 3). Film, as an audio-visual representation of the
body, extends this definition of an irreducible Self to include in it human qualities that
are  "'outside'  culture" and  that  can  be  shared  and  empathized  with  through  the
synchrony of the filmed body with the body of the viewer-listener (MacDougall, 1998:
260). 
6 At that early point in our interaction, the potential of Mr. X's voice to induce empathy
within the viewer beyond cultural differences was unconsciously palpable, but along
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with it, I imagined a second potential and subversive quality that his narration might
hold: creating a ghost-like presence of a person who is forced to be invisible and yet is
always there, a disembodied voice that haunts the screen, and forms a reminder of a
subject who is not seen, but who shall be heard. 
 
Constructing a Counter-representation
7 The main representational choice in my ethnographic film project – to conceal the body
and  emphasize  the  voice  – stands  in  contrast  to  the  common portrayal  of  African
migrants in Western mainstream media, as well as to the cultural and socio-political
perception of African migration that this portrayal endorses in the public discourse.
Generally  speaking,  such  representations  construct  the  migrants'  identity  as  either
agentless victims or as a threat of unstoppable infection through the accentuating of
their bodies and the erasing of their voices (Falk 2010: 89). This common portrayal in
visual media involves a construction of stereotypes using visual metaphors, such as the
wide night-vision shots portraying migrants as a green faceless mass resembling toxic
pollution (Cisneros 2008: 581). Another example is a display of authorities using gloves
and protecting masks around migrants, which associates them with a pandemic. One
can  also  find  visual  associations  to  Christian  motifs  displaying  migrants  as  passive
martyrs.  These  visual metaphors  serve  the  common  and  at  times  generalizing  or
inaccurate  press  coverage,  which  leads  to  the  public’s  perception  of  migrants  as
potential terror threat,  economic concern and demographic problem (de Haas 2008:
1305). Additional inaccuracies in the portrayal of African migrants have shaped their
conventional public image – as masses of uneducated African boat people driven by
extreme poverty, tribal warfare and starvation, rather than people who are often from
countries that have gone through economic development and are of reasonably well-off
backgrounds (Flahaux and de Haas 2016: 23).3
8 What mainstream media coverage of the migration issue tends to omit is the nation-
state's involvement in the construction of illegalization of migration (Falk 2010: 96).
This  construction can be traced back to  the very beginning of  the phenomenon of
migration, along with the rise of the modern sovereign nation-state, as Hanna Arendt
claims (1979). The nation-state's sovereignty, defined by "homogeneity of population
and rootedness in the soil" (1979: 270), offers no solution for minorities and "stateless"
people, i.e. refugees not lucky enough to have been born within the borders of a nation-
state  so  as  to  enjoy  basic  human rights  accompanying  citizenship  (1979:  285;  293).
Along with this construction of migration,  which is  kept concealed from the public
discourse, one might wonder whether, despite its explicit condemning, migration is not
in fact discreetly tolerated and even desired in European and other countries relying on
migrant labour (de Haas 2008: 1315). This discrepancy between the representation of
migrants  and  their  actual  position  in  Western  society  is  also  noticeable  when
examining the spaces in which they are mostly represented.  Through visual  media,
migrants only become visible at the borders, and thus mark the borders by their very
existence. However, once they are inside Europe, thus blurring the boundaries between
"outside" and "inside" the "fortress of Europe", they are often erased from the public
discourse (Falk 2010: 96).4 
9 As  the  idea  of  collaboration  with  Mr.  X  emerged,  it  was  clear  that  we  would  be
highlighting the experience of a migrant and refugee within Europe, not at the borders,
Can Ethnographic Filmmaking Truly Be Shared?
Anthrovision, Vol. 7.2 | 2019
4
not  just  in  the  camps.  Moreover,  the  methodology  and  aesthetic  approach  that  I
envisioned for this filmic experiment would themselves be a kind of infiltration of the
fortress  of  Europe,  not  the  political  one  necessarily  but  rather  the  fortress  of
mainstream media representation. I decided to meet again with Mr. X and share with
him my vision of this counter-representation: it would be an ethno-biography, a story
of one refugee's experience within and outside the local cultural environment; it would
be a work in which Mr. X could perform both as a film subject and as a partner in the
screenwriting process, and recount stories of his life which we would record and then
recreate  or  illustrate  with the camera;  it  would be  a  filmmaking process  in  which,
although directed to some extent by me, Mr. X could choose what to place in the film's
frame. Thus, while having lost control over his own visual representation due to his
political status, in this film he would evade the camera's gaze and obtain a gaze of his
own,  surveilling  others  instead  of  being  himself  under  objectifying  surveillance.  I
hoped that, through his control over the representation of the surrounding world, Mr.
X would enjoy an experience of empowerment as a man who sees but cannot be seen. In
addition, through his framed invisibility, the film could draw attention to the political-
cultural order of the common objectifying representation in mass media, while also
reversing  it.  Finally,  our  very  collaboration  could  challenge  the  conventional
objectifying  representation  and  redefine  the  relationship  between  the  traditionally
active image-maker and forcibly passive migrant. 
 
Ethics in Representation of Migration
10 When I arrived at my second meeting with Mr. X, ready to share my filmic vision with
him, I was also loaded with legal information, and hence full of apprehension that Mr.
X might reject our collaboration due to its inevitable peculiar conditions. Mr. X and I
sat down in the same café at Kottbusser Tor where we first met, and before we ordered
I  expressed  my ideas  about  a  shared  project,  clarified  that  the  project  would take
several  months,  and  said  that  unfortunately  I  could  not  grant  him  copyright,
retribution or public recognition as my collaborator, as long as he did not obtain a work
permit  in  Germany.  Mr.  X  said  he  didn't  mind the  money.  He  wanted  to  work  on
interesting projects. Our work officially began. 
11 Even with this verbal agreement, which we later sealed with a legal contract as shown
in the film, no legal arrangement could cover the ethical questions that arise from a
project in which I, as a director, make use of the subjective point of view of a person
whose legal status differs from mine. Before I move on to discuss the ethical complexity
of my experiment, I shall first analyze the ethical stance that this experiment takes
with  regard  to  the  objectifying  representation  of  African  migrants  in  mainstream
media – through the prism of Levinas's study of ethics (1979). 
12 The  common  representation  of  African  migrants  in  mainstream  media  which,  as
mentioned  before,  focuses  on  the  migrants' presence  at  the  borders  of  Western
countries rather than on their life within the nation-state, nurtures the dehumanizing
demarcation of African migrants as Others. Being outsiders, the migrants define the
members  of  the  nation-state  as  the  Self  situated  at  home  or  chez  soi,  to  borrow
Levinas's term (1979: 37). The sense of being at home, mentioned here in a cultural-
political  context,  plays  for  Levinas  an  epistemological  role.  Levinas  equalizes  the
attitude of “chez soi” to a thinker's act of self-identification that consists in defining –
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and  thus  possessing  –  "the  other  of  the  world".  He  refers  to  this  attitude  as
"sojourning", which reduces the Other to a system of references created within the
world of the Self, to categories of knowledge denying the Other's alterity. This alterity
is not the formal "simple reverse of identity". Rather, it  is an irreducible Other, an
alterity that defies through its very being the "imperialism of the same" (1979: 36-39).
Once  the  Other  is  reduced  to  the  same,  to  generality,  his/her  individuality  is
diminished (1979: 44). As Levinas sees it, reduction of the Other's alterity to sameness is
the basis of Western thought which places ontology as its first and foremost philosophy
(1979: 43). To him ontology is a philosophy of ego, of power and injustice, as it places
the freedom of exploitation over ethics (1979: 44-46). 
13 According to Donald Martin Carter's  research about the African diaspora in Europe
(2010), the otherness of these "other cultures" of the migrants, which differentiates
them from the local Western culture, has a grave effect on the decision to exclude them
from society. The consequential  state of  "invisibility" of  the migrant,  as  termed by
Carter, devalues their subjectivity and leaves their presence unacknowledged (2010: loc
175).  Furthermore,  Carter  notes  the  complex  relations  between  the  migrants'
invisibility and their "hypervisibility", which, as noted earlier, is also expressed by the
excessive reportage of their presence at the borders of the nation-states they wish to
enter: the invisible marks the outline of the visible, which could not delineate itself
without the invisible bordering it (Carter 2010: loc 171).
14 This political and cultural manifestation of the forceful possessing of an irreducible
Other acts as a form of oppression. If we consider that cultural identity is not a fixed
entity untouched by history and social change but rather a positioning, the possession
and appropriation of the irreducible Other can shape the Other's identity accordingly
(Hall 1990: 226; 236). In the case of the African diaspora, says Carter, their experience of
invisibility  as  a  cultural  identity,  conceived  through  man-made  construction  of  a
specific political system, can be gradually woven into cultural traditions and become a
taken-for-granted and conventional perception of reality (2010: loc 455). 
15 Going back to the subject of visual representation, photographic depictions are said to
have  the  ability  to  perform  two  parallel  processes  associated  with  the  social
construction of identity: the construction of reality through the visual representation
and the naturalization of  this  construction to the point where it  seems part of  the
reality constructed by it  (Carter 2010: loc 1529).  Thus, images play a crucial role in
implanting stereotypes into a culture. However, the visual discourse has the power not
only  to  depict  people  in  a  stereotypical,  demeaning  manner,  but  also  to  offer  a
different, subjective portrayal – as agents. Stuart Hall calls for cinematic representation
of migrants, noting its importance "not as a second-order mirror held up to reflect
what already exists, but as that form of representation which is able to constitute us as
new kinds of subjects" (1990: 236-237). However, the illegalization of many migrants
prevents them from realizing Hall's vision, as it denies them the right to appear before
camera, raise funds for films or distribute them (Grassilli 2008: 1245). 
16 A collaboration in which the legal status of a citizen-filmmaker is used to help share the
story and point of view of a non-citizen is a potential solution to the lack of direct
access of illegalized migrants to media channels, and to the consequential effacement
of their subjective experiences from Western public discourse. Of course, from a purist
point of view this is not a flawless solution, as the authority is never solely at the hands
of the non-citizen. At best it is shared, and most likely it remains at the hands of the
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citizen-filmmaker.  When  we  embarked  on  the  project,  I  naively  disregarded  the
complexity of this matter of authority that the project raised, and with which I was
confronted later on. At this point, what I mostly sensed was the potential of the in-
depth dialogue between Mr. X and me that the collaborative ethnographic approach
opened up. 
17 In  order  to  construct  the  film's  narrative,  Mr.  X  began  telling  me,  in  a  series  of
encounters, about his life. Our open-ended talks were set so as to allow for a flow of
consciousness on the part of Mr. X, in which he would be free to draw landscapes that
could exist outside of my cultural and personal frame of thought. Once in a while I used
non-directive questions leading to data that could serve the film's narrative. At times
we actively engaged in "brainstorming", deliberately searching for experiences suitable
for cinematic scenes. A part of this dialogue was also dedicated to my telling Mr. X
about myself in order for us to create a mutual sense of familiarity.
18 This form of dialogue, on which I shall further elaborate shortly, follows the path paved
by Levinas in his critique of the centrality of ontology and its reduction of the Other to
familiar categories. In order to acknowledge and accept the irreducible Otherness of
the Other and replace ontology with ethics as a main philosophy, Levinas promotes the
use of a face-to-face encounter, a dialogue with the Other. The proximity that the face-
to-face  encounter  creates  keeps  the  Self  from gazing  at  the  Other  from afar,  from
generalizing this Other according to a set of qualities and themes, and forces the Self to
notice  the  personal  expression  of  the  face.  Levinas  stresses  that  this  conversation
naturally still separates the Self from the Other and so does not eliminate the egoism
inherent to this separation, but it places the right of the Other's existence over the ego
(1979: 40). This form of ethical relationship relinquishes the inscription of a totalizing
history  which  unjustly  ignores  the  Other's  Otherness,  and  promotes  a  history  of
dialogue between human beings, which allows an acceptance of an irreducible quality,
what Levinas defines as an infinity (1979: 52).
19 In  line  with  Levinas's  theory,  once  my  face-to-face  encounter  with  Mr.  X  was
established, the irreducible quality of his complex identity seemed irrefutable. During
four meetings, each lasting about two hours and consisting of a general conversation
about Mr. X's life, images of Italy, West Africa and Berlin began to take shape, and with
them the intricate image of a journalist, music lover, practitioner of Islam, student of
photography, resident in a refugee camp, worker in an Italian farm, child in an African
compound. We gradually learned to converse more clearly, getting used to each other's
accents. Mr. X once told me that not one of the various languages he spoke was fluent,
be it his English, Italian, Arabic or Mandinka, the language of his ancestral tribe.
20 These  fragmentary  stories,  which  could  not  be  condensed  into  a  simplified,  fixed
cultural  identity,  started  materializing  into  scenes  in  my  mind.  I  envisaged  the
locations in these stories being reflected through images of similar Berlin locations,
which, being shot empty, would become in a way actors re-enacting ghosts, memories
that can no longer be reached.  Furthermore,  I  sensed that the linear nature of  the
audio-visual medium could be used to express Mr. X's complex individuality. I imagined
how,  in  the  editing  stage  of  the  film,  different  scenes  representing  different
experiences  from  different  times  could  be  spliced  together  in  a  non-chronological
order. With this fragmentary style we could bring together different cultural and social
spheres that affected Mr. X throughout his life while breaking the orderly manner in
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which an identity is  expected to be presented.  Thus,  the film structure could itself
challenge the reduction of Otherness to familiar formulas. 
21 Before our sixth meeting, I emailed Mr. X a description of the scenes I envisaged: a
scene in an internet café,  another in the park, yet another in the activists' refugee
camp at Oranienplatz. I asked for his opinion and inquired if he could think of ideas for
more scenes. He arrived at the next meeting with a suggestion for a new scene that we
could shoot at Checkpoint Charlie – a tale about one of Mr. X's neighbours in Africa,
who in the 1980s constructed a wall next to his compound and named it Berlin Wall.
This idea eventually became the first scene we would shoot, and one of the few scenes
looking back at Mr. X's life at his far-removed African home. It was also during the
shooting of this scene that I first encountered the challenges of shared authority. 
 
Levinas's Other, Ethnography and Film
22 When Mr.  X and I  met  for  the first  shoot  at  Checkpoint  Charlie,  I  gave him a few
directions: "Shoot as if you're a ghost who no one can see". Entering the unfamiliar terrain
of collaboration, I felt unsure how to balance the relationship with Mr. X: I suddenly
feared relinquishing my control by putting this scene in Mr. X's hands; at the same
time, I was afraid that I might smother his creativity. I could not decide: should I train
Mr. X, who was more familiar with still photography, how to work with video? Would
such training harm his spontaneity? As the scene existed solely in my head, and I failed
to fully communicate it to Mr. X, he took the shots with no beginning and end point.
Ironically, out of a desire not to patronize Mr. X with technical instructions, I took the
camera from his hands and began taking shots just "to be on the safe side". In the
editing room, my extra shots eventually proved redundant. They just were not as good
as Mr. X's.
23 As we shot three more of our planned scenes in Berlin, the work still seemed quite
rigid. Our somewhat peculiar distribution of roles was a construct still in development.
The  nature  of  our  work,  however,  changed when we  travelled,  along  with  Mr.  X's
landlady, to a four-day African music festival in Würzburg in the south of Germany. Mr.
X and I were suddenly tourists together, in a place unfamiliar to both of us. Moreover,
reality  forced  us  to  improvise:  on  the  second  day  of  the  festival,  a  storm  flooded
Southern Germany, leading to the cancellation of most of the events. None of the shots
I had planned for this festival could be made. We found ourselves wandering aimlessly
around town for whole days, awaiting the evening shows which still took place, but for
which we did not have the rights to shoot. Out of this "togetherness" a new dynamic
emerged. Mr. X started shooting scenes and capturing images on his own initiative.
Having accepted the change of plan imposed on us, I found myself more at ease with
the haphazard filming of scenes. A significant moment occurred when, having realized
no photography was allowed of the festival's concerts, Mr. X suggested that we sneak
the camera in and shoot the audience members reacting to the live music. He shared
this  thought  with me mere seconds after  the same idea came to  my mind.  At  this
moment I felt we had developed an understanding, a kind of synchrony. 
24 At the same time, I could not ignore the fact that, as I initiated the collaboration, chose
the theme and was to edit the material, Mr. X might not feel fully "at home" in my
cinematic construct. But within its limitations, our role play became more and more
flexible with each scene that we shot since Africa Festival. One day, back in Berlin, Mr.
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X  called  me  about  a  big  musical  happening  in  the  park,  which  he  suggested
incorporating  in  the  film.  Conversely,  before  shooting  a  scene  showing  African
souvenirs in Mr. X's landlady's flat, Mr. X asked me to give him exact instructions how
to shoot. A scene in which Mr. X interviews his landlady was initiated by me, but the
questions were chosen by Mr. X. Finally, a sequence displaying Mr. X's mundane daily
routine at home was shot at my request but by Mr. X alone, without my presence or my
direction. This independently-shot sequence, which represents the experience of a man
in  limbo  awaiting  his  full  legal  status,  is  to  me  a  direct  proof  of  Mr.  X’s  creative
sensibility, as well as proof of the value of relinquishing one’s control.
25 This artistic dialogue shared by Mr. X and me during the film shoot can be seen as a
continuation of our face-to-face encounter, but in a different setting, not that of verbal
exchange, as playful as it may be, but rather of active creation. One might wonder why
such activity belongs in ethnographic research and whether it is of any anthropological
value at all, as it is not an examination of everyday habits and repeating rituals but
rather a study of a unique happening, a filmic collaboration artificially constructed for
the sake of my research. In answering this, Levinas's ethical approach again comes in
handy,  specifically in its  application in documentary and ethnographic film theory.
Michael  Renov  (2004)  applies  Levinas's  ideas  in  his  reflection  on  the  ability  of
documentary film to produce an ethical conversation between the Self and the Other.
He presents  David  MacDougall's  criticism over  the  detached observational  mode of
filmmaking  in  which  the  filmmaker,  pretending  to  be invisible,  creates  a  filmic
monologue  presented  as  an  objective  documentation  of  reality,  rather  than
acknowledging the effect of his/her presence over the Other (Renov 2004: 152).
26 As mentioned earlier, one of the first examples of an attempt to replace the monologue
of the filmmaker with a dialogue with protagonists is Jean Rouch's method of shared
anthropology ([1975]  2003:  96).  With this  practice,  Rouch preceded the postmodern
anthropological approach that emerged 20 years later as part of the so-called "crisis of
representation" in human studies.  Postmodern anthropology acknowledged that the
researcher  does  not  obtain  knowledge  necessarily  superior  to  the  common  sense
existing in everyday life about the cultural world he/she examines. Furthermore, the
researcher cannot exist outside of his/her research field and dominate its every corner
in a detached way. This understanding led to a new self-reflexive approach: "rather
than engaging in futile attempts to eliminate the effects of the researcher, we should
set about understanding them" (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983: 15-17). 
27 In my collaborative project with Mr. X, I strove for self-reflexivity in more than one
manner: Firstly, on a methodological level, I aimed at constructing with Mr. X what
Barbara Myerhoff terms a "storytelling relationship", in which the traditionally passive
informant  serving  the  needs  of  the  ethnographer  is  elevated  to  the  position  of
storyteller (Kaminsky 1992: 129; 133). Myerhoff recognizes this relationship not as a
pure  accumulation  of  data  untouched  by  the  researcher's  presence,  but  as  an
artificially  circumstanced  collusion  of  two  specific  individuals  who  meet  to
ethnographically examine one life. Such collision inevitably leads to a re-shaping of the
informant's story, as this story would be different if it was told to someone else, at
another  time,  in  a  different  context  and  for  a  different  cause.  Myerhoff  sees  this
specific  dialogue  between  informant-storyteller  and  ethnographer-listener  as  a
moment  in  which  a  third  person  is  born.  This  third  person,  who  "should  not  be
mistaken for the spontaneous, unframed life-as-lived person who existed before the
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interview began",  expresses  an  abstract  "third  voice",  the  voice  of  a  new creation
(Myerhoff  1992:  291-292).  In the case of  our work,  the voice of  a new creation was
expressed  through  our  joint  shaping  of  Mr.  X's  story  into  filmic  scenes  and  the
construction of  narrations and visual  images that would not only represent his  life
story  but  also  his  self-reflexive  perception  of  the  camera.  Secondly,  on  a
representational level, I decided to appear on camera myself in many scenes in which
Mr. X could not appear, and physically replace his presence in the filmic manifestation
of his experiences. This way, I wished to intensify the deconstruction of the politics of
representation by the positioning of the researcher, me, in front of Mr. X's camera, and
self-reflexively  challenge  the  traditional  relation  between  the  researcher  and  the
observed subject.
28 By applying these self-reflexive techniques in an audio-visual ethnographic text rather
than  a  written  one,  I  followed  the  postmodern  anthropological  approach  which
contributed to the growing interest in experiential rather than analytical knowledge
(MacDougall 1998: 93). This development led to the recognition of visual means – which
until  then  were  generally  condemned  by  anthropologists  for  lacking  intellectual
substance – as "essentially no more subjective or objective than written texts" (Pink
2001:  1).  This  growing  postmodern  awareness  brought  the  contemporary  study  of
anthropology closer to Rouch's aim to dismantle the monopolization of observation by
anthropologists, which he believed can be achieved through filmmaking (Rouch [1975]
2003: 98).
29 The  intersection  of  film,  anthropology  and  Levinas's  critique  of  the  centrality  of
ontology draws focus to the very physicality of the act of observation as well as its
epistemological  significance.  The  gaze  enabled  by  the  film  apparatus,  according  to
critical film theory,5 is not dissimilar to the "self-gratifying gaze of the voyeur", which
the scientist enjoys while observing his/her subjects in a passive and detached way
(Jenks 1995: 4). Thus, sight is the means of pleasure through control in cinema, just as it
is the means for understanding the world in empirical science, which turned the visible
into the most  reliable component of  reality (1995:  6).  Yet,  in neither the cinematic
realm nor the scientific one can sight truly capture reality as a whole,  as it  always
leaves out the infinite Otherness evading the gazing eye.
30 Christian Suhr and Rane Willerslev (2012), whose utilization of Levinas's concept of the
infinite  Other  in  the  field  of  ethnographic  film  has  been  instrumental  to  my  own
research, examine the issue of film's illusion of a whole reality in the context of the
representation  of  the  Other.  They  follow  Levinas's  idea  that  in  the  face-to-face
interaction the Other's face hides an invisible face,  one that expresses an excess of
Otherness (2012: 292). As they say, this plenitude of Otherness is ignored by the often-
used method of participant observation in ethnographic cinema. Although this form of
observational cinema differentiates itself from the monologist observational tradition
through a self-reflexive defiance of the film's objectivity, it still relies on undisturbed
observation to create a sense of familiarity with the Other. Though it can be seen as an
ethical endeavor, this method centralizes on the similarity between the Other and the
Self, thus in fact reducing the Other to sameness (2012: 283-284). Suhr and Willerslev
believe that the only way for cinema to express the invisible face of the Other is to
sacrifice the observed subject by eliminating the synchronization of the camera with
the observing eye. To them, the use of visual manipulations can construct different
perspectives and thus express an ever-changing existence of Otherness that cannot be
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captured whole by camera (2012: 293-294).  As expressed earlier,  I  did not shy away
from creating in my film a sense of familiarity with Mr. X. Although such practice can
be linked to  Levinas's  "imperialism of  sameness",  I  did  in  fact  want  the  viewer  to
identify  and  empathize  with  Mr.  X  through  his  narration.  However,  I  hoped  that
through the emphasis on the absence of the film's main character from the screen – a
visual manipulation that the eye cannot ignore – the viewer will not only acknowledge
the cultural and political constraints Mr. X is facing, but also become conscious that
there are elements that he/she is not privileged to see, access or control. Having the
subject of the film escape his being reduced to a conventional representation of an
African migrant,  I  hoped Mr.  X's  viewpoint on his  surroundings combined with his
subjective narration could construct an unusual cultural experience – an audio-visual
manifestation  of  Levinas's  concept  of  the  invisible  face.  With  this  representation I
intended to expose the selective nature of the visual image, and of sight and vision
altogether. I wanted to challenge the viewer's gaze, having him or her acknowledge the
invisible,  the  different,  the  culturally  diverse  which  cannot  become part  of  a  false
image of a whole reality.
31 As much as I wished for Mr. X to use the representational constraints imposed on him
as means of resistance against the political-cultural order, our time working together
showed me that this attempt did not necessarily lead to the results I expected. When I
suggested taking a shot of groups of Africans standing at the side of the pathway, Mr. X
expressed reluctance. He did not want to be associated with an illegal act. "But,", I said,
"your name is not mentioned". "Even though" he replied, "There are many people – Germans,
Arabs, Turks – that deal in the park, but when the African does it, it's the talk of town. And I
cannot explain to them that, you know, I am not' part of them, nobody will believe in me". Even
as an anonymous voyeur,  Mr.  X did not  feel  released from a surveilling gaze.  This
proved that the vision that ignited the project, a vision conceived within me, was in
fact contested by reality.  It  was contested by Mr. X's sincere emotions. And yet his
emotions are now depicted in one of the scenes of a film created according to this
contradictory vision. Does this mean that I managed to merge my voice and Mr. X's
together into what can be perceived as the Myerhoff's "third voice"? Or was I plainly
using my authority to appropriate Mr. X's story and shape it  to fit  my needs? This
question followed me into the editing room where I mostly worked alone. Although my
editing  choices  were  examined,  approved  and  at  times  suggested  by  Mr.  X,  the
subjective flow of ideas and stories that the editing expressed was still created by me,
and yet the point of view that the images reflect suggests that it is the subjective flow
of  ideas  of  Mr.  X.  While  editing  I  wondered:  Could  taking  control  over  the
representation  of  Mr.  X's  identity  be  avoided,  or  should  it  be  accepted?  If  any
ethnographic text is, to a certain extent, a researcher's manipulation of "reality", does
the film's fragmentary structure at least manage to expose the manipulation?
 
Collaborative Film – A True Encounter?
June 2014. Daytime at Görlitzer Park. Mr. X and I arrive together and start
walking through the park. I tell him we need to get a shot of the Africans
standing around for our scene featuring the music festival. Mr. X asks me:
"Why are we shooting only Africans? Why is it important for the film?" I ask what
he means. He replies: "I see myself as one guy in the middle of millions. There are a
lot  of  Whites  that  are here you could be choosing before me.  So it’s  my doubt,  I
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wanted to ask". I explain that originally my interest was not in "capturing the
Africans", but in finding someone who, like me, was not German and would
speak to me in English, a language that would be a meeting point for both of
us. "Why do you ask?" I ask him. "Because I have a skeptic mind" he says, "I don’t
even trust myself. I always say 'yes' to things and only later analyze it, and it never
comes to my favour". We go back to work and I ask him again to shoot the
Africans. "Maybe you go, and I stay here". I ask him if that's what he prefers to
do. "I just don't want to embarrass my fellow-Africans. I don't want somebody is
telling me a foul word[...] like, you know, you are a shit guy, you let the white girl use
you to take our picture and then show it to the people". 
32 Though it is hard to deny the ethical potential of the idea of shared anthropology and
shared filmmaking, the question that reverberates throughout this text is whether it is
possible to truly maintain such a democratic practice. Going back to the father of this
method,  Jean  Rouch,  it  should  be  mentioned  that  not  all  of  his  experiments  with
collaboration met with the participants' full approval. An example is Oumarou Ganda's
expressed resentment toward Rouch for falsifying his life story in the collaborative
ethno-fiction film Moi, un Noir, and for excluding him from the editing process (Henley
2009: 331). Furthermore, this film is unquestionably known as a Jean Rouch film. He is
the one credited and renowned for this inventive work, not his protagonists.  These
issues  raise  the  question  whether  "shared  authorship"  can  really  be  applied  and
whether the mechanism of film production allows for a true collaboration, a genuine
escape from "the moral burden of authorship" (Ruby 1995: 80).
33 In his  Levinasian examination of  ethnographic and documentary film, Renov (2004)
claims  that  even  in  reflexive  and  interactive  documentary  films,  in  which  the
filmmaker's presence and its ideological effect are acknowledged, the film remains a
"conceptualization  of  the  maker".  Thus  the  film acts  as  a  means  of  persuasion,  of
sharing a message that the filmmaker wishes to convey through the interaction with
the Other, rather than an expression of dialogue (Renov 2004: 152). Hal Foster terms
this tailoring of the Other as an embodiment of the artist's viewpoint an "ethnographic
self-fashioning" (1996: 306). Renov wonders whether film – or ethnography – has the
ability to avoid possessing the Other and exploiting reality: "[…] are these not the
ethical  limits  within  which  all  ethnographic  practice  must  reside?  [...]  Can  any
documentary act hope to escape unscathed?" (2004: 152-153).
34 With this inquiry in mind, Renov turns to Martin Buber's definition of the "encounter"
that emphasizes the importance of spontaneity in conversation between the Self and
the Other. According to Buber, the sphere in which the two meet should not compel
their individuality nor their existence as a collective, but must exist in between the
familiar sphere of each. In this sphere, which the two share and yet neither of them
exclusively owns, a real conversation emerges. It is a dimension which only the two of
them  access.  Renov  wonders  whether  the  technology  of  film  or  video  –  which
reproduces and commodifies the audio-visual representation of reality – could in fact
perpetuate the spontaneity of Buber's real conversation which can only happen in "real
time". Furthermore, if the sphere shared by the two interacting people must only be
accessed by the two of them, one wonders how it could exist on film, which is meant to
be shared with an audience (Renov 2004: 153). 
35 In the case of Napps, there were definitely elements in the dialogue between Mr. X and
me  that  I  would  define  as  "spontaneous",  especially  at  the  previously  mentioned
flooded African music festival in Würzburg. In line with Buber's idea of a sphere in-
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between the familiar spheres of the Self and the Other, Mr. X and I found ourselves in a
geographically unfamiliar sphere where we began improvising scenes and recording
spontaneous  conversations.  The  spontaneous  nature  of  our  interaction,  which
continued later during shooting days in Berlin, led to a change in the course of the film
which I could not have predicted. Such is the moment incorporated in the film, when
Mr. X wonders about my decision to make a film with him: "Why would you not find a
person who have a legal right to work with you?" Having placed Mr. X behind the camera in
order to contest the law denying his ability to represent his story, I was surprised by his
feelings that the law in Germany, determining his illegality, should be respected. In this
manner, Mr. X questioned de facto the agenda behind the film's most basic feature – its
reliance on a collaboration with a man of illegal status. 
36 This clash of world views, brought together in one film, was a result, I believe, of the
spontaneity  and  openness  of  our  interaction,  enabled  by  the  familiarity  that  our
collaboration  generated.  However,  this  spontaneous  conversation  was  actually
recreated  for  the  film.  Although the  original  dialogue  that  Mr.  X  and  I  shared  is
identical  to  its  re-enactment  which  appears  in  the  film,  the  fact  that  it  was  only
recorded with a microphone led me to suggest to Mr. X to re-enact my side of the
dialogue in front of the camera. This form of re-enactment, when concealed, would of
course be ethically questionable, to say the least. However, the film reflexively admits
to its own falsification in its beginning: in a scene portraying the moment I approach
Mr. X for the first time and suggest we make a film together, he is already holding a
camera  and filming me,  which naturally  could  not  occur  in  real  life.  Through this
artifice I wished to remind the viewers that generally speaking any documentary or
ethnographic film is,  to an extent,  a directed,  modified and manipulated version of
reality, whether it is acted or not. Nevertheless, the re-enactment brings us back to
Renov's  statement  that  film  is  not  spontaneous  and  cannot,  therefore,  convey  the
ethics of Buber's encounter. 
37 My motive for the abovementioned re-enactment of the scene brings up the second
reason for  Renov's  questioning  the  film as  an  encounter:  its  being  shared  with  an
audience. Had I not wished to incorporate our dialogue in the film and share it with
viewers, I would not have re-enacted it. Thus, my wish to transmit a filmic experience
to the viewers affected this scene as well as other ones. In order to tackle this tension
between the intimate dialogue and the need to publicize it,  I  turn again to Levinas
(2011). Challenging his own idea of the ethical one-on-one relationship with the Other,
Levinas reminds us that these intimate and ethical relationships would unavoidably
take place within a greater social and political system. He stresses the importance of
systems of justice and law that depend on the ethics of face-to-face encounters at the
same time as they contradict the intimacy of these encounters. In this context, Levinas
defines the concept of "the third party", which represents another Other, a third who
through his/her presence puts a limit to the responsibility of the Self towards the Other
in  their  face-to-face  encounter  and  raises  the  issue  of  public  responsibilities.  The
relationship with the Other which, as we have seen, exists beyond categorization or
thematization, when faced with the presence of the third party, is also faced with the
need  to  be  brought  into  consciousness,  to  be  thematized.  This  third  party,  which
represents all the Others of the world, is in need of such things as comparison and
thematization, of an order through visibility of faces (2011: 157-158). Levinas calls this a
work of justice (2011: 159). This work of justice can be interpreted as the evolving of the
ethics of face-to-face encounters into public laws, into the order of a society. Levinas
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settles  the  tension  between  the  one-on-one  relationship  and  the  universal
thematization  by  stressing  that  this  system  of  justice  –  the  law,  the state  and  its
institutions – is not an elimination of the relationship between the Self and the Other.
Rather, the one-on-one relationship with the Other gives meaning to the relationship
with all the other Others. Thus, the system of justice depends on the proximity between
the Self and the Other (2011: 159).
38 Can collaborative film settle the tension between the intimate relationship with the
Other and presence of the third party – in this case, the potential viewers of the film?
Can it balance the intimate and the public? Finally, can it overcome what seem to be
unavoidable flaws in its claimed democracy? With these inquiries in mind, I now wish
to return to a scene in the film in which the desire to find the balance between Mr. X's
and my one-on-one relationship and its publicizing led, when screened, to unexpected
responses from the audience. The scene I refer to is our dialogue in the park, in which
Mr. X protests at my proposal to display the African people working as weed dealers
and contextualizes the dealers' need to work for their  survival  in a  trade that  was
neither their first choice nor their original livelihood. In order to express his fear of the
danger of film, which can be misinterpreted by the viewers and affect the perception of
African  migrants,  Mr.  X  presents  me  with  a  question  already  mentioned  earlier,  a
question which in reality he asked twice: "Why you are only interested in shooting Africans
that hang around here? Why is that, is that important to the film?" In the original shoot I
answered both questions immediately, explaining my reasons for this scene as well as
for the whole film. Once I was done I told him: "I hope my answer was sincere, and good.".
"Anyway you can always edit it as you want", he said with a smile. Ironically, I did indeed
cut  my  answer  out  of  the  film.  The  reason  was  my  wish  to  allow  the  viewer  to
experience  the  world  of  the  film  without  my  authoritative  analysis  which  was
expressed in my answers. Furthermore, in my "thematization" of my encounter with
Mr. X, I preferred to focus on Mr. X's voice, to give space to his worldview rather than
mine. Interestingly enough, in several screenings of the film, viewers criticized my lack
of answer to Mr. X's question which, as they said, created an inequality in the dialogue
between us, as I only draw information from him but never supply him with any in
return. Thus, my wish to avoid an on-screen "self-fashioning" of Mr. X through my
reply led to the creation of a self-fashioned dialogue: I, as the creator of the film, the
one who initiated the project, used my authority to change the representation of our
encounter as I pleased, even if I believed it was in the benefit of Mr. X's story. Also,
ironically, it was the audience itself that noted the artificial quality of our dialogue,
which I only changed for the sake of the audience's experience. In real life it was in fact
more spontaneous and incidentally more balanced. One could say that in my attempt to
intertwine my responsibility towards Mr. X and my wish to bring our dialogue into
consciousness, I stumbled on both accounts. 
39 To conclude, the analysis of my collaboration with Mr. X supports Renov's claim that
the need to bring to consciousness, present and thematize a recorded encounter with
the Other might sacrifice the spontaneity of the encounter and consequently some of
its ethical value. However, perhaps the balance of the intimate and the public does still
exist in my film thanks to the interest of Mr. X himself in publicizing his story. Our
relationship was never based on a "pure" discreet dialogue which later became tainted
by  its  exposure  to  outside  viewers,  but  on  dialogue  based  on  a  shared  desire  to
collaborate in film. Thus,  this  encounter was always meant for publication through
visual  media.  This  is  exemplified  by  Mr.  X's  choice  to  incorporate  the  shot  of  the
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Africans in the park in the film despite his fear of potential misrepresentation. Having
reflected on this issue for a while during the editing process, Mr. X finally decided that
externalizing the story of people forced to work as weed dealers to a "third party" – the
viewer – had significance, as long as it was accompanied by his contextualizing voice. In
fact,  Mr.  X's  belief  in  the  significance  of  visual  representation  and  preservation  is
voiced within the film itself, when he elaborates on his interest in photography: 
40 It keeps me reminding the things that have passed. At times I used to ask my mom about her
father, I got curiosity, whether he's a tall man, whether he's a short man, or fat, or slim-body
man. Immediately when I saw the picture of him, I  recognized. Yeah, it  teaches you history.
About the faces of the people. About how some people look like.
41 I hope that the recording of this spontaneous dialogue with Mr. X expresses the ethical
importance of distributing the film and sharing it with the third party. It is a necessary
thematization, which sacrifices the intimacy with the irreducible Other for the sake of
justice, to use Levinas's term. Nevertheless, I hope that the choice to accompany this
specific  recording of Mr.  X with a black screen,  turning the darkened frame into a
metaphor  of  Mr.  X's  invisibility  while  allowing  it  to  be  filled  with  his  soft  voice,
manages to transmit some of the intimacy of my one-on-one encounter with Mr. X.
42 Naturally, even if such intimacy does reach the viewers through the aforementioned
scene, it  will  not eliminate the imperfections of collaborative ethnographic film. Its
claimed ethical superiority will quite inevitably and justly continue to be questioned
and challenged. However, even as a flawed form, the collaborative method enables an
interaction between Others,  a humanist dialogue necessary in a world in which the
displacement and movement of populations from one country to another seems to be
ever-growing. Furthermore, in political spheres in which groups of people are denied
the opportunity  to  portray themselves  in  media,  collaborative  film can construct  a
representation  that  counters  the  common  visual  rhetoric  offered  by  mainstream
media, and that pushes forward a narrative that would otherwise be effaced from the
pages  of  history.  All  the  same,  its  imperfect  nature  also  becomes  an  important
reminder that collaborative film is no substitute to a visual representation made freely
and independently by those whose legal status renders them invisible.
 
Afterword
43 In 2018, Mr. X was granted a 2-year work visa in Berlin, which since then has been
renewed. As a result, he agreed to have his identity revealed as part of our film. His
name, occupation in Berlin and region of origin in Africa are now shared at the end of
the last scene: Muhammed Lamin Jadama, translator and cultural educator, originally
from the Senegambia region. Accompanying this information is a photograph which
shows his face.
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NOTES
1. For more information about the struggle for survival of many refugees in Italy, leading them at
times  to  engage  in  criminal  activities  and  prostitution  and  living  on  the  street  see  http://
www.noas.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Italia-rapport.pdf (accessed 13 September, 2020).
2. According to  the  Dublin  I  and II  regulations  adopted by  all  EU member  states  and other
European states, asylum application cannot be submitted twice (NOAS 2011: 5; 10; 35).
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3. Germany, where Mr. X resides, has been one of the more welcoming countries to refugees in
the EU and proves to produce rather empathetic press coverage of migration as compared to
other European states. However, portrayals of refugees as a security threat have been displayed
in newspapers representing both sides of the political map in Germany, and the portrayal of
migrants and refugees as financial burden has been on the rise in right-wing oriented papers
(Berry, Garcia-Blanko and Moore 2015: 259-261).
4. In the German press, there is some reporting of positive integration of refugees (for example,
in the rather leftist Sűddeutsche Zeitung). However, right-wing oriented papers such as Die Welt or
Bild tend to report such stories briefly and without sufficient context (Berry, Garcia-Blanko and
Moore 2015: 259).
5. See  for  example  Laura  Mulvey's  feminist  film  theory  (1975),  Jean-Louis  Baudry's
cinematographic apparatus theory (1974-1975) and Catherine Russell's  writing on the subject
(1999: 121).
ABSTRACTS
Collaborative  ethnographic  filmmaking  has  been  celebrated  as  a  practice  that  ethically
challenges  the  traditional  relationship  between  the  observing  researcher  and  the  observed
Other.  At  the  same  time,  the  collaborative  mode  raises  the  question  whether  it  can  truly
dismantle the researcher's authority as it claims. This article addresses these issues by examining
the writer's collaborative film Napps - Memoire of an Invisible Man, in which the main protagonist –
a West African refugee living in Berlin without a work permit – stands behind the camera as
cinematographer and storyteller while keeping his identity and face concealed.
The  article  addresses  Emmanuel  Levinas's  critique  of  Western  thought's  emphasis  on
accumulation of  knowledge,  and his  call  to  replace  the  epistemological  appropriation of  the
Other with an ethical one-on-one dialogue. Contextualizing the migrant's political and cultural
invisibility,  the  article  parallels  the  Western  mindset  with  common  objectifying  visual
representation  of  African  migrants  in  mainstream media  which  denies  the  migrants'
individuality. The article references Levinas's influence on approaches to ethnographic film in
order to  examine collaborative filmmaking's  ability  to offer  a  more ethical  representation of
African  migrants.  It  reflects  on  Napps's  collaborative  nature  and  its  purpose  to  reverse  the
cinematic/ethnographic gaze and both bypass and confront the migrant's forced invisibility, and
the  underlying  political,  cultural  and  epistemological  order. Finally,  the  article  critically
questions the film's ability to follow the demands of the ethical dialogue between the Self and the
Other according to Levinas and Martin Buber.
La réalisation collaborative de films ethnographiques a été célébrée comme une pratique qui
remet  en  question,  d'un  point  de  vue  éthique,  la  relation  traditionnelle  entre  le  chercheur
observateur  et  l'Autre  observé.  En même temps,  le  mode collaboratif  soulève la  question de
savoir s'il peut réellement démanteler l'autorité du chercheur comme il le prétend. Cet article
aborde ces questions en examinant le film collaboratif de l'auteur, Napps - Mémoire d'un homme
invisible, dans lequel le principal protagoniste - un réfugié ouest-africain vivant à Berlin sans
permis de travail - se tient derrière la caméra en tant que cinéaste et conteur tout en gardant son
identité et son visage cachés.
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L'article traite de la critique d'Emmanuel Levinas sur l'accent mis par la pensée occidentale sur
l'accumulation des connaissances, et de son appel à remplacer l'appropriation épistémologique
de  l'Autre  par  un  dialogue  éthique  en  tête-à-tête.  Contextualisant  l'invisibilité  politique  et
culturelle du migrant, l'article met en parallèle la mentalité occidentale avec la représentation
visuelle  objectivante  courante  des  migrants  africains  dans  les  médias  grand  public,  qui  nie
l'individualité des migrants. L'article fait référence à l'influence de Levinas sur les approches du
film  ethnographique  afin  d'examiner  la  capacité  du  cinéma  collaboratif  à  offrir  une
représentation plus éthique des migrants africains. Il réfléchit à la nature collaborative de Napps
et à son objectif de renverser le regard cinématographique/ethnographique et de contourner et
confronter  à  la  fois  l'invisibilité  forcée  du  migrant  et  l'ordre  politique,  culturel  et
épistémologique sous-jacent. Enfin, l'article remet en question de manière critique la capacité du
film à suivre les exigences du dialogue éthique entre le Soi et l'Autre selon Levinas et Martin
Buber.
El cine etnográfico colaborativo ha sido elogiado como una práctica que, desde el punto de vista
ético,  desafía la relación tradicional entre el  investigador observador y el  Otro observado. Al
mismo tiempo, el modo colaborativo plantea la cuestión de si realmente es capaz de desmantelar
la autoridad del investigador, tal como plantea. Este artículo aborda estos problemas examinando
la película colaborativa del autor, titulada Napps - Memoire of an Invisible Man, en la que el
protagonista  principal,  un  refugiado  de  África  Occidental  que  vive  en  Berlín  sin  permiso  de
trabajo, está detrás de la cámara como director de fotografía y narrador mientras mantiene su
identidad y cara oculta.
INDEX
Mots-clés: migration subsaharienne, statut de réfugiés, invisibilité, médias, anthropologie
visuelle, anthropologie partagée, film collaboratif, éthique, Levinas
Palabras claves: El artículo aborda la crítica de Emmanuel Levinas al énfasis del pensamiento
occidental en la acumulación de conocimiento, y su llamado a reemplazar la apropiación
epistemológica del Otro por un diálogo ético de igual a igual. Contextualizando la invisibilidad
política y cultural del migrante, el artículo compara la mentalidad occidental con la común
representación visual objetivante de los migrantes africanos en los principales medios de
comunicación, en que se les niega la individualidad. El artículo hace referencia a la influencia de
Levinas en los enfoques del cine etnográfico con el fin de examinar la capacidad del cine
colaborativo para ofrecer una representación más ética de los migrantes african, evitando y
confrontando así la invisibilidad forzada del migrante así como el orden político, cultural y
epistemológico subyacente. Finalmente, el artículo cuestiona críticamente la capacidad del cine
para respetar las exigencias del diálogo ético entre el Yo y el Otro según Levinas y Martin Buber.
Keywords: Sub-Saharan migration, refugee status, invisibility, media, visual anthropology,
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